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Emerging Military Technologies: 
Balancing Medical Ethics and 
National Security 
Efthimios Parasidis1 
This article, prepared for the CETMONS-Frederick K. Cox 
International Law Center’s symposium, International 
Regulation of Emerging Military Technologies, examines the law 
and ethics of emerging biomedical innovations. In addition to 
unpacking the legal regime that governs the military biomedical 
complex, I discuss the ethics and regulation of human subjects 
research, the overlap between military law and military 
medicine, and the socio-medical implications of the current 
framework.  
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I. Introduction 
The twenty-first century is quickly taking shape as the age of the 
biomedical military. As the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 
candidly states, one of its primary goals is to exploit the life sciences 
to create soldiers with superior physical, physiological, and cognitive 
abilities.2 Projects include: (1) developing drugs that can reduce fear, 
increase aggressiveness, or keep individuals awake and alert for up to 
seven days straight; (2) genetically engineering the human immune 
system so that it is able to recognize and adapt to any pathogen; (3) 
creating implantable electrodes that permit human-to-human and 
human-to-computer communication via thought alone; and (4) 
establishing human-to-computer interfaces that are able to detect a 
person’s neurological state and release neurochemicals that can 
combat fatigue, enhance mood, suppress or improve memory, or 
facilitate learning.3  
Emerging biomedical technologies are creating new paradigms for 
reevaluating the law and ethics governing the practice of medicine 
and medical research. Although the motto of the American military 
physician is to “conserve the fighting force,” an integral component of 
military research concerns physical and cognitive enhancements that 
endeavor to augment human faculties. While biomedical 
enhancements have yet to be used on a widespread basis in the 
theater of war, it may just be a matter of time before enhancements 
are integrated into military missions. Not only must policy-makers 
and the military consider the practical implications of enhanced 
warfighters, a more fundamental question that must be addressed is 
who should be responsible for balancing national security priorities 
with medical, social, and ethical concerns.  
 
2. TONY TETHER, DEF. ADVANCED RES. PROJECTS AGENCY, STATEMENT TO 
THE SUBCOMM. ON TERRORISM, UNCONVENTIONAL THREATS AND 
CAPABILITIES 11 (2003). 
3. For project details, see Catherine L. Annas & George J. Annas, 
Enhancing the Fighting Force: Medical Research on American Soldiers, 
25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y. 283, 283–308 (2009); Michael N. 
Tennison & Jonathan D. Moreno, Neuroscience, Ethics, and National 
Security: The State of the Art, 10 PLOS BIOLOGY, no. 3, Mar. 2012 at 1; 
JONATHAN D. MORENO, Juicing the Brain, 17 SCIENTIFIC AM. MIND, no. 
17, Dec. 2006, at 66–73; Hannah Hoag, Neuroengineering: Remote 
Control, NATURE, June 19, 2003, at 796–798; Michael H. Bonnet et al., 
The Use of Stimulants to Modify Performance During Sleep Loss: A 
Review by the Sleep Deprivation and Stimulant Task Force of the 
American Academy of Sleep Medicine, 29 SLEEP 1163, 1176–1180 
(2005).  
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As with civilian legal doctrine, military law recognizes a 
distinction between the practice of medicine and medical research. 
With respect to the former, military law dictates that the DoD can 
mandate that service members comply with an order to be 
administered treatment of an FDA-approved medical product that the 
DoD determines is in the best interest of an individual service 
member or a military mission.4 One recent example is the smallpox 
vaccine mandate that was promulgated in 2002. Although smallpox 
was eradicated in nature in 1980, many countries have access to the 
smallpox virus via laboratory stockpiles.5 After 9/11, the DoD feared 
that smallpox would be used against U.S. troops as a biological 
weapon, and thus DoD determined that the smallpox vaccine was 
needed as prophylaxis.6 In turn, DoD administered the vaccine to 
thousands of service members. Although smallpox was not used 
against U.S. troops, many service members suffered vaccine-related 
adverse health effects, including serious and unanticipated cardiac 
adverse events.7 Notably, since DoD deemed administration of the 
smallpox vaccine to be a requirement of service, pursuant to military 
law, a service member who refused the vaccine was subject to court-
martial and severe punitive measures, such as docked pay and 
dishonorable discharge.   
With respect to military medical research, federal regulations and 
DoD guidelines provide safeguards for military personnel who take 
part in biomedical research conducted or sponsored by the military. In 
part, these protections aim to ensure that service members are not 
coerced or compelled into serving as research subjects.8 At the same 
 
4. Efthimios Parasidis, Justice and Beneficence in Military Medicine and 
Research, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 726 (2012).  
5. Naomi Seiler, Holly Taylor, & Ruth Faden, Legal and Ethical 
Considerations in Government Compensation Plans: A Case Study of 
Smallpox Immunization, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 3, 5 (2004). 
6. Bryant J. Webber et al., Spread of Vaccinia Virus Through Shaving 
During Military Training, Joint base San Antonio–Lackland, TX, June 
2014, MED. SURVEILLANCE MONTHLY REP., Aug. 2014, at 2, 2. 
7. See, e.g., Seiler, Taylor & Faden, supra note 4, at 12-13. As will be 
discussed in this article, in addition to the smallpox vaccine, mandatory 
prophylaxis for anticipated chemical or biological warfare has also 
included administration of the anthrax vaccine, pyridostigmine bromide 
(PB), and the botulinum toxoid (BT) vaccine. See generally, John D. 
Grabenstein et al., Immunization to Protect the U.S. Armed Forces: 
Heritage, Current Practice, Prospects 28 EPIDEM. REV. 3 (2006) 
(reviewing the historical practice and scope of military immunizations). 
8. The regulations were enacted, in part, in response to research conducted 
by the military during the twentieth century. The studies—which 
includes mustard gas experiments, radiation experiments, and 
experiments with LSD and other psychotropic drugs—are well 
documented. See, e.g., Parasidis, supra note 3, at 724.  
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time, however, there are exceptions to the regulations that allow the 
DoD to mandate that non-FDA-approved products be administered to 
service members.9 When this occurs, the line between research and 
practice is blurred, and it becomes unclear whether, and to what 
extent, protections governing research involving human subjects 
apply.  
The military’s emerging focus on biomedical products and human 
enhancements complicates the legal and bioethical issues that are 
raised by the coalescence of military medicine and military research. 
For example, in the context of emerging biomedical technologies, it is 
unclear what risk-benefit profile is acceptable during battle, and 
whether that standard should change in times of peace, or when war 
is imminent. It is also unclear to what extent risk-related information 
must be provided to service members, and whether they should be 
afforded the opportunity to opt out of treatment with enhancements 
or experimental products. Importantly, should a product- or research-
related adverse event occurs, injured service members do not have the 
full spectrum of legal remedies available to them as civilians do.  
II. A Tangled Web of Laws and Regulations Governs 
Military Medicine and Research 
A. The Development of Federal Guidelines in the United States 
Federal regulations governing research on human subjects are a 
relatively recent construct. Although medical research in the U.S. 
dates back to the beginning of the republic, a federal framework 
governing human subjects research was first established in 1974 
following “a series of highly publicized abuses” at the hands of 
government researchers and physicians.10 The 1974 guidelines 
established a system that centered on utilization of institutional 
review boards (IRBs) to review research protocols.11 Five years later, 
 
9. 10 U.S.C. § 1107 (1998) (codifying notice of use of an investigational new 
drug or a drug unapproved for its applied use). 
10. Human Subjects Research Protections: Enhancing Protections for 
Research Subjects and Reducing Burden, Delay, and Ambiguity for 
Investigators, 76 Fed. Reg. No. 143, 44512 (July 26, 2011) (to be 
codified at 45 C.F.R. 46, 160 & 164). The abuses are well documented, 
and include the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, as well as experiments 
conducted at Willowbrook State Hospital and the Brooklyn Jewish 
Chronic Disease Hospital. See, e.g., JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE 
TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1982); Allan M. Brandt, Racism and 
Research: The Case of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 8 HASTINGS CTR. 
REPORT 21 (1978); Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966); CARL COLEMAN ET AL., ETHICS AND 
REGULATION OF RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS 37–44 (2003). 
11. Although the federal guidelines have since expanded, IRBs continue play 
an integral role in the oversight of research involving human subjects. 
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the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical Research and Behavioral Research (the “National 
Commission”) published the Belmont Report, which identified 
fundamental ethical principles that should govern research involving 
human subjects.12 A series of amendments to the federal regulations 
followed, culminating, in 1991, with the publication of the Common 
Rule.13  
The Common Rule sets forth guidelines that apply to 
government-funded research with human subjects.14 Under the 
Common Rule, there are three primary mechanisms for protecting 
research subjects: informed consent, review by an IRB, and 
institutional assurances of compliance with federal policies.15 Among 
its provisions, the Common Rule requires that risks to research 
subjects are minimized, and that risks are reasonable in relation to 
the anticipated benefits.16 The Common Rule also provides additional 
protections for “vulnerable populations,” which are defined as 
populations that are subject to coercion or undue influence. Currently, 
these subpopulations include pregnant women, children, human 
fetuses and neonates, and prisoners.17 The supplemental protections 
include procedural guidelines addressing membership on IRBs that 
review research protocols involving vulnerable populations, as well as 
substantive guidelines that IRBs must consider in reviewing and 
monitoring the research.18  
In 2011, the U.S. government published an Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, which highlighted the drastic change in the 
research landscape since the time the Common Rule was adopted and 
the need for amendments to the law to account for these changes. In 
calling for amendments to the Common Rule, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Service (HHS) and the Office of Human Research 
 
12. Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Research, Report Of the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979).  
13. Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §46 (2014) (original version at 
56 Fed. Reg. 28,002 (1991)). 
14. Many institutions voluntarily adopt the Common Rule requirements for 
all research involving human subjects, though the federal requirements 
only mandate that, for non-government funded research, the institution 
commit to complying with general principles of human subjects research 
as, for instance, outlined in the Belmont Report. See id.; COLEMAN ET 
AL., supra note 9, at 107. 
15. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101–46.124. 
16. Id. 
17. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.201–46.409. 
18. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.201–46.505.  
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Protection (OHRP) emphasized the fact that the law has “not kept 
pace with the evolving human research enterprise,” and highlighted 
areas, including “advanced technologies” and “genomics,” where this 
has been the case.19 To date, however, no amendments to the 
Common Rule have been enacted.  
B. The Framework Governing Military Personnel 
The DoD has adopted the Common Rule,20 and Executive Order 
12333 mandates that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) comply 
with the guidelines outlined in the Common Rule.21 In addition, DoD 
Directives provide additional safeguards for service members who are 
solicited for, or enrolled in, clinical trials that are conducted or 
sponsored by the government.22 At the same time, however, a number 
of laws and regulations provide exceptions that negate many of the 
protections. The following is a snapshot of the tangled web of laws 
and regulations that apply to military personnel:  
•DoD Directive 3216.02, issued November 8, 2011, defines a key 
triggering term for Common Rule protections—”research 
involving human subjects”—to exclude: (1) “activities carried 
out solely for purposes of diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of 
injury and disease in Service members and other mission 
essential personnel under force health protection programs”; and 
(2) activities related to an “operational test and evaluation” 
(OTE) project.23 Under 10 U.S.C. § 139, an OTE project is a 
“field test, under realistic combat conditions, of any item (or 
key component of) weapons, equipment, or munitions for the 
purpose of determining the effectiveness and suitability of the 
 
19. 76 Fed. Reg. 44,512; see generally, OFC. HUM. RES. PROT., 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/ (last visited November 22, 2014) (OHRP is 
the division within HHS that “provides leadership in the protection of 
the rights, welfare, and wellbeing of subjects involved in research 
conducted or supported” by HHS).  
20. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 56 Fed. Reg. 
28,003, 28,012 (June 18, 1991) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 219).  
21. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 1981 Comp., p. 200 (1981), reprinted 
as amended in 3 U.S.C. 2008 Comp., p. 1064 (2008) (“No agency within 
the Intelligence Community shall sponsor, contract for or conduct 
research on human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued 
by the Department of Health and Human Services. The subject’s 
informed consent shall be documented as required by those guidelines.”).  
22. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Instru’n No. 3216.02 (Nov. 8, 2011), 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/ whs/directives/ corres/ 
pdf/321602p.pdf. 
23. Id.  
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weapons, equipment, or munitions for use in combat by typical 
military users.”24  
•The Project BioShield Act of 2004 creates the Emergency Use 
Authorization (EUA) process, which provides the FDA the 
authority to grant the DoD permission to use a medical product 
for off-label or investigational purposes during a declared 
emergency.25 Although an EUA may be issued for both civilian 
and military populations, only military personnel are subject to 
forced use.26  
•Under 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f), for members of the armed forces, 
the President of the U.S. can issue an informed consent waiver 
for off-label or investigational use of a medical product so long 
as the use is “in connection with the member’s participation in 
a particular military operation.”27  
•10 U.S.C. § 980 grants the DoD the authority to issue an 
informed consent waiver if a research project aims to “advance 
the development of a medical product necessary to the armed 
forces” and “may directly benefit the subject.”28 The statute 
does not describe the procedure that must be employed when an 
informed consent waiver is granted, nor does the law limit the 
type of research that may be conducted.  
Taken together, in the context of human subjects research 
protections, the military biomedical complex presents a case where 
the exceptions swallow the rule. For example, the ability to obtain an 
informed consent waiver, or bypass the clinical trial setting, and 
“field-test” experimental products eviscerates meaningful safeguards 
for service members. Likewise, when “activities,” as anticipated by 
DoD Directive 3216.02, include use of non-FDA approved medical 
products or enhancements, procedures that would trigger human 
subjects research regulations in the civilian context fail to do so for 
military personnel. The risks borne by service members are 
significant.  
 
24. 10 U.S.C. § 139 (2008); see also U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra, note 24 
(“research involving a human being as an experimental subject” includes 
activities where “an intervention or interaction with a human being for 
the primary purpose of obtaining data regarding the effect of the 
intervention or interaction”) (emphasis added). 
25. See Project BioShield Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-276, 118 Stat. 835 
(2004) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §201 (2004)). 
26. Id. 
27. 10 U.S.C. § 1107(f) (2004). 
28. 10 U.S.C. § 980(b) (2001).  
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 47 (2015) 
Emerging Military Technologies 
174 
Recent examples highlight the dangers. In the 1990s, fearing use 
of chemical weapons during the first Gulf War, the military 
“pretreated” service members with pyridostigmine bromide (PB) and 
the botulinum toxoid (BT) vaccine, two products that the FDA was 
evaluating as prophylaxis aimed at mitigating the effects of chemical 
warfare.29 Following the war, veterans began suffering from serious 
health problems that included cognitive difficulties, chronic 
headaches, musculoskeletal problems, respiratory ailments, and 
widespread pain, and had children born with birth defects at an 
alarming rate.30 In 2008, nearly two decades after administration of 
the experimental products, studies revealed that PB was one of the 
factors that most likely caused the health problems.31 Commonly 
referred to as Gulf War Illness, the symptoms affect between 175,000 
and 250,000 veterans, which equates to approximately one-third of the 
fighting force during the war.32 
The DoD’s anthrax vaccine immunization program (AVIP), which 
commenced in 1998, was no less controversial. AVIP mandated off-
label use of an existing anthrax vaccine for service members deemed 
to be at risk for anthrax exposure.33 Although the FDA approved the 
vaccine to protect against cutaneous anthrax (anthrax that comes 
into contact with the skin), the military sought to use the vaccine as 
a pretreatment for inhalation anthrax (anthrax that is inhaled) 
despite the fact that the FDA had not evaluated the safety or 
effectiveness of the vaccine for inhalation anthrax.34  
A congressional report, published in 2000, criticized AVIP, 
characterizing the program as an “overwrought response to the threat 
of anthrax” and one that “compromises the practice of medicine to 
achieve military objectives.”35 The report found that the DoD 
provided service members with “heavy handed, one-sided 
 
29. Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1372 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
30. See RES. ADVISORY COMM. ON GULF WAR VETS.’ ILLNESSES, GULF WAR 
ILLNESS AND THE HEALTH OF GULF WAR VETERANS: SCIENTIFIC FINDINGS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2008), available at http://www.va.gov/rac-
gwvi/docs/committee_documents/gwiandhealthofgwveterans_rac-
gwvireport_2008.pdf?tab_tab_group_id=_2_1&url=%2Fwebapps%2F
blackboard%2Fexecute%2Flauncher%3Ftype%3DCourse%26id%3D_790
42_1%26url%3D. 
31. Id.; Justice Delayed: Acknowledging the Reality of Gulf War Illness, 372 
LANCET 1856 (2008).  
32. RES. ADVISORY COMM. ON GULF WAR VETS.’ ILLNESSES, supra note 29 at 
4.   
33. Rempfer v. Sharfstein, 583 F.3d 860, 863 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
34. Id. at 863. 
35. U.S. DEF. DEP’T, ANTHRAX VACCINE IMMUNIZATION PROGRAM: 
UNPROVEN FORCE PROTECTION, H. REP. NO. 106-556, at 2 (2000). 
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informational materials,” and that the agency was “far more 
concerned with public relations than effective force protection or the 
practice of medicine.”36 The DoD refused to suspend the program, and 
subsequent studies found that approximately one-in-five service 
members suffered systemic adverse events, which are adverse health 
consequences that last more than seven days and sometimes can last 
for years or even a lifetime.37 The systemic adverse events were more 
than one hundred times those reported by the vaccine manufacturer, 
and adverse reactions affected women at a rate more than twice that 
of men.38 Moreover, AVIP was implemented despite the fact that the 
vaccine had not been evaluated for the potential to impair fertility or 
cause fetal harm.39 
Not only is medical research highly uncertain—on average, five of 
six products under review by the FDA fail to earn regulatory 
approval40—but a mélange of legal doctrines and immunities also 
shield the government from liability in the event of injuries caused by 
negligence or intentional harm. Given the military’s checkered history 
of research with human subjects, the real-world impact of the 
immunities is stunning. For example, the Feres doctrine prevents 
service members from suing the government, government employees, 
or agents working on behalf of the government in situations where a 
service member’s injuries “arise out of or are in the course of activity 
incident to service.”41 Courts have interpreted the Feres doctrine 
broadly to encompass claims raised by service members who suffered 
severe injuries after military officials locked them in gas chambers and 
exposed them to mustard gas against their will,42 as well as soldiers 
who were harmed by coerced or compelled participation in the 
military’s atomic experiments43 and the DoD’s clandestine 
psychotropic drug experiments.44 In each case, since the conduct 
occurred while the soldiers were subject to military command, the 
Feres doctrine served to foreclose legal remedies.  
 
36. Id. at 2-3. 
37. Id. at 38. 
38. Id. at 35–36. 
39. Id. at 40. 
40. Leonard Sacks, et al., Scientific and Regulatory Reasons for Delay and 
Denial of FDA Approval of Initial Applications for New Drugs, 2000-
2012, 311 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 378, 379 (2014). 
41. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
42. Schnurman v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 429, 438 (E.D. Va. 1980).  
43. Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1239 (3d Cir. 1981). 
44. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 705 (1987). 
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Coupled with the broad immunities provided by the Feres 
doctrine, under the political question doctrine, courts are also barred 
from reviewing military decisions that are political in nature.45 
Political questions include instances where it is impossible for a court 
to render a judgment without making a policy decision that is beyond 
the court’s discretion, or where a court’s decision would express “a 
lack of respect for a coordinate branch of the government.”46  
In addition to outright dismissal of a case pursuant to the Feres 
doctrine or the political question doctrine, the state secrets privilege 
provides the government with the ability to withhold information in 
instances where officials believe that the information could expose 
facts that may compromise national security.47 The government has 
invoked the privilege often, including cases related to rendition, 
torture, interrogation, warrantless wiretapping, widespread 
surveillance of American and foreign civilians, drone attacks, and 
lethal targeting of American and foreign citizens.48 Courts rarely 
uphold challenges to the government’s assertion of the privilege, 
though investigators have uncovered instances where the government 
used the privilege not to protect a state secret, but rather to cover-up 
wrongful conduct.49 The recent controversies surrounding drone-
targeted killings and the NSA’s surveillance programs are examples 
where the government has used the state secrets privilege to prevent 
disclosure of facts directly related to legal challenges to the 
programs,50 and there is nothing that prevents the government from 
invoking the privilege to withhold information in the event of a 
research-related injury or a challenge to a research protocol. While 
there are important reasons for limiting the ability of courts to pass 
judgment on matters of national security, equally as important is 
maintaining a judicial system that adequately holds government 
actors responsible for the outcomes of their decisions. 
 
45. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 227 (1962). 
46. Id. at 217. 
47. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953); Tenet v. 
Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005). 
48. Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1941, 1945–46 (2007). 
49. Id. at 1942–50. 
50. Spencer S. Hsu, Obama Invokes ‘State Secrets’ Claim to Dismiss Suit 
Against Targeting of U.S. Citizen al-Aulaqi, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 
2010, 1:49 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2010/09/25/AR2010092500560.html; Ellen Nakashima, U.S. 
Reasserts Need to Keep Domestic Surveillance Secret, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 21, 2013), http:// www. washingtonpost. com/ world/national-
security/us-reasserts-need-to-keep-domestic-surveillance-secret/2013/ 
12/21/9d2b4538-6a7e-11e3-a0b9-249bbb34602c_story.html. 
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For service members, the implications of the legal and regulatory 
regime must be analyzed in light of obligations imposed by the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which is the legal system 
governing the armed forces. Under the UCMJ, a subordinate officer 
must obey a lawful order of a superior officer.51 This provision applies 
in equal force if the order is a split-second combat-related command 
given on the battlefield, or an order given on a U.S. base that relates 
to a medical treatment deemed by officials to be necessary for the 
good of the armed forces.52 With respect to the latter, existing 
regulations do not limit medical-related orders to products approved 
by the FDA.53 And, on a number of occasions, the DoD has mandated 
that soldiers submit to non-FDA-approved medical products as a 
requirement of service.54 Under the UCMJ, refusal to submit equates 
to disobeying an order and can result in punitive measures that 
include reduction in rank, docked pay, jail time, and dishonorable 
discharge.55  
Sanctions pursuant to this provision are not merely theoretical. 
Since the 1990s, the DoD has prosecuted hundreds of service 
members, including military physicians, who refused administration of 
medical products that were not approved by the FDA for the use 
intended by the DoD.56 During the prosecutions, military courts 
consistently denied requests by soldiers to submit evidence of safety 
concerns, holding that such information was irrelevant to the 
underlying issue of whether the soldier obeyed a lawful command.57   
51. United States v. Washington, 57 M.J. 394, 396 (C.A.A.F. 2002). 
52. Id. at 398. 
53. See Determination that Informed Consent is Not Feasible or Is Contrary 
to the Best Interests of the Recipients, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,180 (Oct. 5, 
1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 312) (describing military 
exemption from informed consent requirements); Waiving Informed 
Consent: Military Use of Non-FDA-Approved Drugs in Combat, RAND 
(2000), http:// www. rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/ RB7534/ 
index1.html (analyzing the impact of the proposed rule). 
54. See Application of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Rules of 
Department of Defense Force Health Protection Programs, DoD 
Instruction 6200.02 (Feb. 27, 2008) (stipulating, inter alia, 
considerations upon Heads of DoD Components when deciding whether 
to order vaccination of military forces using non-FDA-approved 
medicines). 
55. See Washington, 57 M.J. at 396 (describing that Airman Washington’s 
refusal to be inoculated with an anthrax vaccine was properly regarded 
as insubordination by his superior officer and the Air Force court 
martial). 
56. Randall D. Katz, Friendly Fire: The Mandatory Military Anthrax 
Vaccination Program, 50 DUKE L. J. 1835, 1837, 1853, 1863 (2001).  
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Washington, 57 M.J. at 398–99. 
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III. The Military’s Emerging Focus on Biomedical 
Innovations 
The legal framework governing military medicine is particularly 
troubling when one considers that a significant component of the 
military’s contemporary agenda focuses on biomedical enhancements. 
In recent years, a notable shift has occurred whereby military research 
and military medicine have coalesced. The traditional role of military 
medicine has been to “conserve the fighting force” by providing 
medical care to military personnel.58 These services have long included 
preventative care, such as FDA-approved vaccines for typhoid and 
yellow fever, and acute care, such as surgery in response to a combat 
injury.59 While military physicians continue to fulfill their traditional 
roles of providing preventative and acute care, the concept of 
conservation has broadened to encompass regimens such as 
inoculations with experimental vaccines and prescriptions for human 
enhancements.60 Insofar as the military’s research agenda is fueled by 
combat-related goals, there is a natural tendency to want to test new 
technologies on the battlefield as quickly as possible.  
Consider Dexedrine and Provigil, two drugs that are FDA-
approved to treat narcolepsy and other disorders. Both are used as 
stimulants to keep soldiers awake during combat missions, despite the 
fact that the FDA has not analyzed whether the drugs are safe or 
effective for individuals who do not suffer from the underlying 
illnesses.61 Although the U.S. government bans commercial pilots from 
using the substances, the Air Force has created dose-specific regimens 
for its pilots.62  
While Dexedrine and Provigil may keep soldiers awake for 
extended periods of time—studies have found that service members 
on Provigil can remain awake for more than eighty hours straight—
complications have arisen as to what a soldier experiences when 
alertness begins to fade.63 People using Provigil tend to think that 
they are more functional than they actually are, and some service 
members have cited enhancements as the root cause in “friendly fire” 
bombings and unprovoked attacks on civilians.64 “Go” pills, such as 
 
58. See Annas & Annas, supra note 2, at 287. 
59. Id.  
60. Id. 
61. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, THE PRICE OF PERFECTION:: INDIVIDUALISM 
AND SOCIETY IN THE ERA OF BIOMEDICAL ENHANCEMENT 16 (2009).  
62. Id. at 21. 
63. See JONATHAN D. MORENO, BRAIN RESEARCH AND NAT’L DEFENSE 115–
116 (2006). 
64. See Annas & Annas, supra note 2, at 294. 
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Dexedrine or Provigil, must often be balanced with “no-go” sedatives, 
such as Ambien or Restoril.65 “No-go” pills carry their own risks—
they are addictive and can cause anxiety, depression, confusion, 
hallucinations, risk-taking behavior, memory problems, loss of 
coordination, and suicidal thoughts.66  
With biomedical enhancements, the public health impact is 
largely unpredictable. Despite the military’s regimented use of some 
enhancements, studies on the short- or long-term health effects have 
not been conducted. Notably, known side effects of enhancements 
such as Provigil and Dexedrine include dizziness, confusion, heart 
palpitations, hallucinations, abnormally excited moods, anxiety, 
depression, extreme psychological dependence, psychotic episodes, and 
suicidal thoughts.67 When coupled with the military epidemic of 
traumatic brain injury (TBI), which impacts an estimated twenty 
percent of troops deployed since 2001,68 the adverse effects of 
enhancements are likely to be compounded.69 Indeed, the VA has 
witnessed an astronomical rise in the number of veterans seeking 
treatment for TBI and other mental disorders, so much so that the 
agency was recently chastised for falsely entering data into patient 
medical records in order to cover-up the backlog.70 The military’s 
moral obligation to ensure that service members are not exposed to 
undue medical risks must take into account the limitations of the VA 
health care system. 
The emergence of the biomedical military is not solely an 
American concern, it is an international one. As the raid on Osama 
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bin Laden’s complex and other targeted missions illustrate, rather 
than waging large-scale wars across the globe, the national security 
strategy of the U.S. has shifted to focusing on special operations by 
elite fighters.71 In many instances, U.S. operations are conducted in 
conjunction with special forces from other nations.72 Not only does the 
U.S. provide extensive training for the joint missions, in some parts of 
the world the U.S. trains foreign forces which then are expected to 
conduct military missions without direct U.S. support.73 If U.S. policy 
permits or encourages use of investigational products or biomedical 
enhancements, researchers and policy makers must consider the global 
impact of such policies. 
The question becomes increasingly complex as one examines the 
regulatory frameworks of other nations. For example, during the 
recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.K. made the anthrax 
vaccine optional for its troops,74 while the U.S. had a mandatory 
anthrax vaccination program.75 Should enhancements, such as 
implantable brain electrodes, become field-tested or used in military 
missions, what impact will this have on nations who fight alongside 
the U.S., but do not adhere to the U.S. model? Furthermore, 
international law may not have an adequate remedy for a problem 
that may arise in this context. Under the Geneva Convention, it is 
unclear whether enhancements, or enhanced soldiers, are a “weapon” 
or a “means or method of warfare”, or if they should be deemed 
“biological agents.”76 Moreover, under the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention, use of biological agents that are “repugnant to 
the conscience of mankind” are prohibited; while, under the Hague 
Convention, warfighting that disturbs the “public conscience” is 
forbidden.77 The extent to which these international laws and norms 
apply to enhancements must be analyzed objectively.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The billions of dollars invested by the DoD and the Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have not been 
provided merely to advance the progress of science. As DARPA 
explains, the investments are intended to create biomedical 
innovations that will transform military strategy and the warfighter.78 
As with weapons of the past, nations will work fervently to acquire or 
copy the newest technologies in order to promote their own military 
agendas, as will non-state-based militaries and terrorist organizations. 
At some point, many technologies will invariably work their way into 
the global community of civilians. Take drones, for example, where 
municipal police and private companies are both examining ways to 
incorporate unmanned aerial vehicles into operations on American 
soil.  
With human enhancements, as bioethicists have discussed, civilian 
uses are both common and, oftentimes, encouraged by custom or 
circumstance.79 Studies have highlighted the extensive use of 
enhancements across socio-economic backgrounds, including use by 
doctors, lawyers, academics, students, and truck drivers.80 Insofar as 
military developments will unquestionably impact civilians, a socio-
medical evaluation of the military biomedical complex is necessary.  
While biomedical innovations may provide soldiers with special 
competitive advantages, they also come with special risks. Although 
medical risk cannot be eliminated—all treatments carry the chance of 
adverse events—the degree of risk of a particular treatment is 
proportional to the robustness of information related to that 
treatment. Simply stated, the more one knows about a medical 
treatment, the better one can predict risks and benefits, and assess 
whether utilization of the treatment is justifiable. This calculation 
contains procedural and substantive components, and deriving an 
accurate risk-benefit profile requires diligence and intellectual honesty 
at each stage of the analysis. One weak link—be it in the process of 
approving use of a biomedical product on military personnel, the 
evaluation of data related to risks and benefits, or the decision to use 
a product for a particular individual—can increase risk exposure 
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significantly and unnecessarily. The potential harms to service 
members are exacerbated when one considers the inadequacies of the 
health care system for veterans.81 
It is in this context that law can play a transformative role, by 
guiding behavior and incentivizing risk management and risk 
mitigation. Yet, rather than mitigating risk by establishing protocols 
that balance national security concerns with clinical uncertainties, 
medical ethics, and constitutional liberties, the current legal and 
regulatory regime increases risk for U.S. service members. In the name 
of national security, the law embeds military command structure into 
military medicine and prevents injured service members from seeking 
redress through the courts.  
The socio-medical impact of the existing regime is striking. 
Studies have consistently found that the odds of a person entering the 
military are correlated with economic status, race, family structure, 
high school academic achievement, and parental education.82 
Individuals who grow up in families of a low socioeconomic status are 
more likely to enlist in the military, while those in the top income 
distribution are under-represented in the armed forces.83 Individuals 
who enlist in the military are less likely to have grown up with both 
biological parents and are more likely to come from families where the 
parents had less education.84 When compared to the general 
population, enlistees have fewer years of formal education and are 
more likely to have dropped out of high school.85 In 2010, African-
Americans comprised 17% of the armed forces and 12.6% of the 
general population, which equates to over-representation of 
approximately 35%.86 African-American women are enlisting in the 
military at a rate far higher than white or Latino women; 31% of 
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women service members are African-American, which is double the 
percentage of the civilian female population that identifies as African-
American.87  
To the extent that laws disproportionally impact under-privileged 
segments of society, elected officials have an indispensable moral 
responsibility to remedy the shortcomings of the existing framework. 
That said, regardless of how elected officials address this problem, the 
fact that a disproportionate impact stems from the status quo 
challenges bioethicists to reconsider notions of equality and 
vulnerability.  
At a broader level, the military biomedical complex provides an 
illuminating paradigm for analyzing the extent to which power 
imbalances should influence the structure of laws governing one’s 
freedom to contract, and for examining the relationship between an 
individual and the sovereign as it relates to the commodification of 
the human body. Should an individual be permitted to contract away 
their right to autonomy? To what extent is a service member the 
“property” of the military or the national security state? Does the 
answer to this question change if a draft is implemented? For 
voluntary or compulsory military service, are there liberties that the 
state should be precluded from usurping?  
Privatization of the U.S. military adds another layer of 
complexity. The post-9/11 security state has developed a substantial 
private militia that utilizes cutting-edge military technologies and 
conducts, among other military endeavors, highly classified special-op 
missions.88 Does the law treat warriors working for private companies 
differently? Should it?  
Military exceptionalism is largely based on the notion that 
collective interests trump individual interests in matters of national 
security. If history is any guide, there must be limits to this principle. 
Proponents of the status quo rely largely on consequentialist or 
utilitarian rationales. At a broader level, however, principles of virtue 
ethics should inform the rule of the law, particularly in instances 
where, as in the military context, vulnerable populations bear what 
may be reasonably characterized as undue risks. 
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